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Drug addiction has been associated with lack of insight into one’s own abilities. However, the scope of 
metacognition impairment among drug users in general and opiate dependent individuals in particular 
is not fully understood. Investigating the impairments of metacognitive ability in Substance Dependent 
Individuals (SDIs) in different cognitive tasks could contribute to the ongoing debate over whether 
metacognition has domain-general or domain-specific neural substrates. We compared metacognitive 
self-monitoring ability of a group of SDIs during methadone maintenance treatment (n = 23) with 
a control group (n = 24) in a memory and a visual perceptual task. Post decision self judgements of 
probability of correct choice were obtained through trial by trial confidence ratings and were used 
to compute metacognitive ability. Results showed that despite comparable first order performance 
in the perceptual task, SDIs had lower perceptual metacognition than the control group. However, 
although SDIs had poorer memory performance, their metacognitive judgements in the memory task 
were as accurate as the control group. While it is commonly believed that addiction causes pervasive 
impairment in cognitive functions, including metacognitive ability, we observed that the impairment 
was only significant in one specific task, the perceptual task, but not in the memory task.
We all make mistakes, from time to time. And we wouldn’t have, had we known that they are mistakes. However, 
most of us are somewhat aware of the probability that our decision might be inaccurate. The ability to introspect 
and monitor one’s own performance is called metacognitive ability. Impairments in metacognition have been 
observed in several neurological diseases (reviewed in David, et al.1 and Ullsperger2) such as Alzheimer’s dis-
ease3, schizophrenia4, early phase psychosis5, traumatic brain injury6, anterior prefrontal lesions7, as well as in 
pathological gambling8. Patients with metacognitive deficiencies may have a misguided feeling of knowing about 
things they are completely ignorant about or imagine that they have done actions that they never took in reality. 
Accordingly, these metacognitive deficits are known as disturbances of “insight”. Patients lacking insight might 
be unaware of the severity of their disease or dispute their need for therapy and medical help. Here we ask if 
metacognitive deficiencies can be found in disorders of substance dependence9.
Substance dependence is characterized by persistent drug use despite negative consequences. Substance 
Dependent Individuals (SDIs) are impaired, among other things, in a wide range of cognitive functions; how-
ever, they seldom have a realistic impression of these problems. Lack of insight is often one of the greatest chal-
lenges for the treatment of drug addiction. These patients tend to underestimate their addiction severity10 and 
are unconsciously biased to drug-related cues11. Defective self-awareness in SDIs is not limited to behaviors or 
thoughts directly related to drugs, but it also includes non-drug related cognitive tasks. For instance, chronic 
cannabis users showed a significant deficit in awareness of commission errors in a go/no go task12. Also, individ-
uals with cocaine use disorder had weaker self-monitoring performance in a visuo-perceptual task13. However, 
whether such metacognitive deficits are indicative of a generalized failure of self-monitoring in substance 
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dependence or alternatively, are specific to the cognitive task under study is unknown. Here we sought to replicate 
self-monitoring deficits previously reported in SDIs and ask if such deficits are general or depend on the specific 
cognitive task under study. The answer to this question can have important consequences for the controversial 
issue of domain specificity of metacognition14–16.
Numerous methods have been developed to measure metacognitive sensitivity quantitatively across individ-
uals and domains. These methods invariably involve making decisions and reporting the choice uncertainty by 
describing the vividness of one’s experience17, rating confidence18, 19 or making a financial wager20. Here we used 
the confidence rating paradigm to evaluate the metacognitive ability.
We compared the metacognitive ability of a group of SDIs with a matched control group in two tasks involving 
memory or perception. Specifically, our SDIs were people with opiate dependence under methadone maintenance 
treatment. Metacognition was examined in a word recognition memory task with controlled words’ imageability 
ratings and a visual search for contrast oddball task. Each trial of both tasks consisted of a 2-Alternetaive Forced 
Choice (2-AFC) question plus a confidence rating about the accuracy of the response. Meta-d′, a measure based 
on Signal Detection Theory21, was used to quantify metacognition in both tasks22, 23.
We asked if metacognitive ability in substance dependent individuals were any different from healthy popu-
lation in the two tasks involving memory or perception. Our results showed that metacognition is significantly 
impaired specifically in one task (perceptual) but not in the other in our SDIs group.
Results
General analysis. For two of the SDIs and one of the control participants, the staircase did not converge 
to the predefined 71% level of accuracy in the perceptual task. These participants had accuracy level lower than 
mean-8*SD of the whole population. They were excluded from further analysis. During debriefing after the task 
completion, these participants stated that they did recognize the spatial location of the odd Gabor in most tri-
als, but had difficulty in discriminating the two stimulus displays as two separate intervals. For all other par-
ticipants (N = 47: 23 SDI and 24 control) staircase successfully restricted variations of individual performance 
(mean accuracy 71%, SD 1%, range 68–73%). Therefore, groups did not differ in perceptual accuracy as expected 
(t(45) = −0.84, p = 0.4). Contrast threshold varied considerably among participants (range 0.043–0.47, SD 0.08). 
However, memory accuracy ranged widely (53–84%, SD 7.6%) since there was no systematic method to control 
memory performance.
To verify that introspective ability was not contaminated by basic task performance we examined the correla-
tion between metacognitive ability (m-ratio) and type 1 task performance (d′). Combining data of all participants 
in both groups, no such correlation was found in memory (r = −0.19, p = 0.21) nor visual perception (r = 0.07, 
p = 0.66).
Figure 1 illustrates metacognition and type 1 performance (d′) of participants. One participant in the memory 
task and two other participants in the perceptual task had below zero m-ratio. All three of them had negative 
meta-d′ and positive d′ which resulted in negative m-ratio. It means that they were worse than a random confi-
dence generator in rating their confidence, when their responses were modeled by the type 2 SDT. However they 
were better than random in their 2-AFC answers when modeled by type 1 SDT. We kept these participants in 
our analysis to avoid any biases in selectively removing any data, though excluding them did not affect our main 
findings.
Figure 1. Metacognition (m-ratio) and type 1 performance (d′) in memory (left) and perceptual (right) tasks. 
The 47 participants (24 Control + 23 SDI) are sorted by their m-ratio in task.
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Consistent with a previous study24 no significant correlation was observed between metacognition in the 
memory and perceptual tasks in either of the groups (SDI: r = −0.01, p = 0.97; Control: r = 0.34, p = 0.10) nor 
when all data was pulled across the two groups (r = 0.12, p = 0.42).
Performance, Metacognitive ability and confidence. The main behavioral measures of the two groups 
are listed in Table 1. Comparing objective task performances, SDIs and control participants were not significantly 
different in perceptual acuity (contrast threshold, t(34.4) = 1.59 p = 0.12) or perceptual task performance (d′, 
t(45) = −0.55, p = 0.59). In the memory task however, the SDIs had a worse performance in recognition of words 
(d′, t(45) = −2.17, p = 0.04)).
A mixed effect ANOVA was conducted to investigate the effect of task or group on mean confidence. Results 
showed no significant main effect of task (F(1,45) = 0.45, p = 0.51, η2 = 0.010) nor group (F(1,45) = 0.74, p = 0.40, 
η2 = 0.016). In other words, mean confidence rating across trials was not different between the SDIs and control 
participants in either of the tasks.
Despite comparable mean confidence ratings and objective performance in the perceptual task, perceptual 
task metacognitive ability was lower for the SDIs compared to the control participants (M-ratio, t(45) = −2.70, 
p < = 0.01). In contrast, in the memory task, although SDIs had poorer basic performance in remembering words, 
they were as accurate as the healthy controls in memory metacognition (unequal variance M-ratio, t(45) = −0.72, 
p > 0.48). Repeating the analysis with equal variance assumption for M-ratio (meta-d′/d′) did not change this 
result (equal variance M-ratio, t(45) = −0.03 p = 0.98). Assuming that equal-variance m-ratio in the visual task 
and unequal-variance m-ratio in the memory task have similar units, there was no significant Group × Task 
interaction effect on metacognition (mixed effect ANOVA, F(1,45) = 1.66, p = 0.20, η2 = 0.034). However, when 
equal-variance measure was calculated for metacognition in both tasks, there was a marginally significant inter-
action between group and task on metacognition (mixed effect ANOVA, F(1,45) = 3.16, p = 0.08, η2 = 0.066).The 
main results from testing our key hypotheses are summarized in Fig. 2.
Response time and Confidence Time. We also analyzed the response and confidence times as presented 
in Table 2. In the visual perceptual task, the Response time (RT) was defined as the time between the 2nd inter-
val termination and the key press indicating the choice in the 2-alternative response. RT in the memory task 
was the time interval since onset of the testing word on the screen until pressing the old/new response keys. 
Confidence time (CT) in both tasks was defined as time after 1st response until key press indicating the confidence 
rating. In the perceptual task, there was a marginally significant difference between the two groups in average RT 
(t(31.8) = 1.96, p = 0.06) and a significant difference in average perceptual CT (t(24.3) = 2.44, p = 0.02), indicat-
ing that SDIs paused a longer time before reporting their response and confidence. In the memory task, however, 
no significant difference was found between SDIs and Control participants in average CT (t(45) = 1.48, p = 0.14) 
or RT (t(45) = 1.32, p = 0.20).
Imageability. Thus far, all 200 trials of the memory test were included in memory analysis; though, as men-
tioned earlier, memory words were labeled as either high or low imageable. In order to examine the effect of 
word imageability on metacognitive ability in the memory task, metacognition (meta-da/da) was calculated 
independently for the high and low imageable words. A mixed effect ANOVA revealed no significant interac-
tion between imageability (high/low) and group (SDI/control) on memory task metacognition (F(1,45) = 0.16, 
p = 0.69, η2 = 0.003) and no main effect of imageability was found(F(1,45) = 0.16, p = 0.84, η2 = 0.001). Moreover, 
there was no correlation between metacognition of high and low imageable words in either of the groups (SDI: 
r = 0.36, p = 0.11; Control: r = −0.09, p = 0.69).
Discussion
The clinical indicators of self-awareness impairment in SDIs have been described previously in the literature 
(see, e.g., Goldstein, et al.9 and Moeller and Goldstein25). However, the precise scope of such impairment is not 
yet fully understood. We compared self-monitoring metacognitive ability of a group of methadone maintenance 
Task
Mean (SD)
SDI Control
Perceptual
Contrast Threshold 0.19 (0.09) 0.16 (0.05)
Accuracy 0.71 (0.01) 0.71 (0.01)
d′ 1.15 (0.13) 1.17 (0.12)
Mean Confidence 4.68 (0.95) 4.74 (0.86)
M-ratio 0.67 (0.38) 1.01 (0.44)
Memory
d′ 0.92 (0.44) 1.19 (0.40)
Mean Confidence 4.63 (0.72) 4.94 (0.71)
Unequal Variance 
M-ratio 0.82 (0.61) 0.93 (0.30)
Equal Variance 
M-ratio 0.85 (0.66) 0.85 (0.39)
Table 1. Behavioral measures for the SDI and Control participants. Mean scores and Standard Deviation (SD) 
are presented.
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patients with a matched control group in a memory and a perceptual task. Our results revealed that compared 
to healthy controls, in patients with history of opiate dependence first order performance accuracy and second 
order metacognitive ability for vision and memory dissociated in opposite directions. The SDIs had defective 
self-monitoring ability in visual perception, despite intact perceptual acuity. In contrast, they were as good as the 
control group in memory metacognitive ability, even though their first order memory performance was weaker.
To our knowledge this is the first study to examine word recognition memory metacognitive ability in the SDIs 
using meta-d′ method, which is an estimate of pure metacognition independent of decision bias, confidence bias 
or first order performance. Several previous studies on SDIs’ word recognition memory (for instance Mintzer and 
Stitzer26 and Le Berre, et al.27) used assessment methods that, recent works28 suggest might be confounded by bias 
or first order performance. It is worth noting that the SDIs’ bias or first order accuracy were not equal to healthy 
individuals in those studies. Having this in mind, their methods prevented from comparison of pure metacogni-
tion between SDIs and control. Here, the SDIs were weaker in the first order memory performance and the effect 
of task difficulty in the metacognition estimation was eliminated using the M-ratio measure.
An ongoing debate about neuronal substrates of metacognition has focused on whether metacognitive ability 
is domain specific or domain general7, 14–16. If a person is good at monitoring his memory capacity, is he also 
good at monitoring his perceptual ability? Is metacognitive ability in different domains dependent on the same 
or different mechanistic (e.g. neural) substrates? These questions have recently been investigated intensively but 
conflicting evidence from different studies have prevented definitive conclusions. Behavioral correlation between 
perceptual and memory metacognitive abilities have been observed16, but evidence for their independence has 
also been provided15. Studies of metacognitive ability in neurological patients have shed some light on these 
issues7. If metacognition involved a unique general neural pathway integrating all tasks, patients should either be 
Figure 2. d′ (top) and m-ratio (bottom) in perceptual (left) and memory (right) tasks. SDIs are significantly 
weaker in memory task type 1 sensitivity and perceptual task metacognitive sensitivity. Perceptual task type 1 
sensitivity and memory task metacognition do not significantly differ between the two groups. *Means p < 0.05.
Task SDI Control
Perceptual
Mean RT 1358 (573) 1099 (283)
Mean CT 831 (613) 510 (143)
Memory
Mean RT 2146 (518) 1964(425)
Mean CT 683 (226) 577 (262)
Table 2. Mean Response Time (RT) and mean Confidence Time (CT) for SDI and Control groups.
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impaired or intact in all tasks. Here we observed that the SDIs have significantly impaired metacognition in one 
task (visual perceptual task) but not in the other (memory task). Therefore, our results lend some support to the 
hypothesis that separate neural substrates for memory and visual metacognitive abilities might exist. In this view, 
isolated impairment of visual metacognition in SDIs could indicate some specificity of metacognitive processes 
in the domains of memory and perception. However, one must bear in mind that the perception vs memory 
dichotomy inferred here, is by virtue of the limitations of empirical experimentation, based on tasks that are dif-
ferent in more than just one cognitive domain (for example, the word recognition memory task involves language 
systems). Future research focused on testing the stability and replicability of metacognitive impairment in Opioid 
dependence will be critical for strengthening the domain specificity claims proposed here.
Another concern of this study was to examine the impact of word imageability on metacognitive ability in the 
memory task, which has not been investigated before. In several previous experiments with similar memory task 
to ours for assessing metamemory, words with high imageability were used (e.g. McCurdy, et al.16), while in other 
experiments no control over words’ imageability was taken (e.g. Baird, et al.24). Here we chose the memory words 
such that half were categorized as high imageable and half as low imageable. Separately calculating metacognitive 
ability in remembering high and low imageable words for each person, there was no correlation between the 
metacognition for the two divisions of words. Lack of correlation between metacognitive ability for high and low 
imageable words could signal the complexity of memory metacognitive processes and the potential impact of 
word imageability on memory metacognition. Intra-individual instability of memory metacognitive ability has 
been reported previously29, 30. On the other hand, one possibility is that increasing number of trials might lead to 
more stable metamemory results29. In our experiment, number of trials used for estimating high or low imagea-
ble words’ type 2 sensitivity is only 100, half of the total number of trials in the memory task. Lack of correlation 
between high and low imageable words’ recognition metacognition could originate from a true effect of imagea-
bility on memory metacognition, or be due to the noise of metacognition estimation. Further experiments with 
higher number of trials are suggested to achieve a more robust conclusion.
Our results are unable to identify the specific mechanism for SDIs’ metacognitive impairment in the visual but 
not the memory domain. Studying the neural underpinnings dissociating perceptual and memory task metacog-
nitive performances in SDIs is an interesting future research. Furthermore, understanding how the findings 
from the laboratory-based controlled experiments on metacognitive ability could be implicated in everyday life 
is another important avenue for future research. In the real world, one may argue that a key concern would by 
whether and how an individual may be capable of monitoring her thoughts and perceptions and how those may 
be affected by opiate addiction. Understanding the relationships between metacognition in these tasks and the 
real-life experiences could introduce new methods for the diagnosis and treatment of patients with self-awareness 
deficits such as addiction.
Methods
Participants. Participants consisted of a group of twenty five Substance Dependent Individuals (SDI) and 
a matched control group of twenty five healthy individuals. Two of the SDIs and one of the control participants 
were excluded from the analysis due to outlier accuracy level in the perceptual task. Other participants (SDI 
N = 23, Control N = 24) successfully finished both tasks. The study was approved by the ethics board of the 
Tehran University of Medical Sciences (TUMS) and the experiment was carried out in accordance with the 
Declaration of Helsinki.
All participants in the study were male, Persian native speaker, aged between 25 to 50 years, with at least 
11 years of formal education and normal or corrected to normal visual acuity. Other eligibility requirements 
included having no history of neurological disorders or psychiatric disorders based on DSM IV criteria (except 
those directly related to DSM IV diagnosis of past opiate dependence). All participants gave informed consent 
for participation.
SDIs were recruited from the research clinic at Iranian National Center for Addiction Studies (INCAS) who 
were stable on Methadone Maintenance Treatment for at least 3 months. The treatment program at INCAS 
requires patients to take routine urine drug-screening tests on a biweekly basis to confirm adherence to treatment 
and abstinence from any drug abuse except Nicotine. Patients with background of positive urine test during the 
last 3 months were not included in the study. Average weekly methadone dose was 121.3 mg (SD = 45.2, range 
40–250) and mean duration of enrollment in the treatment program was 2.73 years (SD = 2.46, range 0.25–7.92). 
Control individuals were volunteers recruited from the staff of University of Tehran and Imam Khomeini hospi-
tal. They had no self-reported history of drug dependence (except to Nicotine). Tables 3 and 4 represent demo-
graphics of participants and self-reported drug use history of the SDIs. There were no significant differences 
between the SDIs and control participants in mean age or education.
Tasks and procedures. All participants performed a perceptual and a memory task. Both tasks were com-
puterized, programmed in MATLAB (Mathworks Inc.) using COGENT 2000 toolbox (http://www.vislab.ucl.
Mean (SD)
SDI (N = 23) Control (N = 24)
Age 37.52 (6.31) 34.09 (6.85)
Education (years) 12.96 (1.72) 12.91 (1.66)
Table 3. Demographics (mean age and years of education) for participants in the SDI and control group.
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ac.uk/cogent.php). Order of tasks was counterbalanced among participants to eliminate the potential effect of 
task order on the results.
The perceptual task was adopted from Fleming, et al.31 and Song, et al.32. In a 2-AFC task, two stimulus dis-
plays were presented in successive time intervals in each trial. Each visual stimulus display consisted of six Gabor 
gratings placed around a central fixation point (eccentricity of Gabor center: 3.6 visual degrees, 3.2 cm). Each 
Gabor patch subtended 1.5 degrees (1.3 cm) and consisted of horizontal alternating light and dark bars modulated 
at a spatial frequency of 2.2 cycles per visual degree with a contrast of 20%. The perceptual task was performed in 
a dark room where the monitor was the only source of light. On each trial of the task, two stimuli were presented 
on the screen serially, each for 85 msec, with an ISI of 1000 msec. One grating in one of the stimulus displays (tar-
get stimulus) had a higher contrast than the rest of the gratings. The interval in which the contrast oddball was 
displayed and its spatial location among the 6 Gabor gratings in the target stimulus was assigned randomly across 
trials. The contrast of the oddball was determined using a 1-up 2-down staircase procedure that was expected to 
converge to an approximate accuracy of 71% for each participant. At the beginning of the perceptual experiment, 
the contrast of the oddball was set to 20% higher than the distractors and it changed adaptively according to par-
ticipant’s performance. The oddball contrast was increased by a step after one incorrect response or decreased by 
a step after two consecutive correct responses. Step size was set to 3%.
Followed by the stimulus presentation on each trial, the participant indicated his 2-alternatvie choice whether 
the target stimuli was in the first or the second interval. Next, he rated his confidence about the accuracy of the 
response using numbers 1 (very unsure) to 6 (very sure).The perceptual task consisted of 180 trials (two blocks of 
90-trials). A variable number of practice trials (between 5 and 25, depending on when the participant indicated 
to have completely understood the task procedure) were conducted prior to the main task.
Memory items were Farsi words chosen from Persian Linguistic Database (PLDB)33 a comprehensive data-
base of Persian language words. Nouns with 4 or 5 letters, 2 syllables and word frequency between 6 and 150 per 
million were selected from PLDB. After excluding words with emotional valence and those with drug-related 
meaning, 290 words were chosen.
We also controlled for words’ imageability in order to investigate the influence of imageability on metacogni-
tive ability for verbal memory. Imageability of a word is a measure of how quickly and easily it invokes a mental 
image. For instance, according to most people, the word “tree” is highly imageable, and the word “result” is less 
so. We ran a survey to select the most and the least imageable words from the list of 290 words. For this purpose, 
words were rated for imageability by 50 university students who did not participate in the main experiment. 
Volunteers were provided standardized instructions on imageability rating. The rating was on a 7-point scale with 
number 1 indicating “very low imageability” to 7 for “very high imageability”. Each volunteer rated a variable 
number of words, between 96 to all 290, and finally each word was rated by 19 volunteers. Ratings were averaged 
across raters and words were sorted by mean imageability. The 100 words with the highest and 100 with the lowest 
mean imageability were selected as the final list of 200 words.
The memory task followed similar protocol to that of Baird, et al.24. We employed a word recognition mem-
ory test consisting of a learning and a recognition phase. During the learning phase, 100 words were presented 
on the screen, one at a time, half of them selected from the high imageable set and the other half from the low 
imageable set. The list of 100 words were randomly chosen for each participant from the pool of 200 words (50 
from 100 high imageable and 50 from 100 low imageable). Each word was displayed at the center of the screen 
for 1500 msec, with an ISI of 1000 msec between subsequent words. A fixation point was shown on the center of 
display during the ISI. In the recognition phase, all 200 words were presented to the participant one at a time. 
The participant decided if the word was new or had previously been presented in the learning phase. They then 
indicated their confidence rating about the response accuracy on a 6-point scale (similar to the perceptual task).
In both tasks, participants responded using the keyboard, with no time limitation. They were instructed to 
enter the 2-AFC responses by pressing numbers 1 (indicating the 1st interval in the perceptual task and “Old” in 
the memory task) and 2 on the keypad with left hand, and rate their confidence by numbers 1 to 6 on the number 
pad with right hand. Participants did not receive any feedback about their performance. Figure 3 illustrates the 
outline of the perceptual and memory tasks.
Statistical Analysis. Intuitively, better self-monitoring is associated with higher confidence when mak-
ing correct decisions and lower confidence when incorrect. However comparing raw values of mean con-
fidence between people can be misleading because the effect of individual biases such as general over- or 
under-confidence could be overlooked. An ideal measure of metacognition should be independent of response 
and confidence biases. In other words, it should discriminate a person’s true metacognitive sensitivity from her 
Lifetime abuse/
dependence
Main drug of 
abuse when 
treatment started
Opium 87% 48%
Brown Heroin 52% 43%
Crystalline White Heroin 43% 9%
Methamphetamine 35% —
Cannabis 39% —
Alcohol 17% —
Table 4. Self-reported drug use history of SDIs.
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inclination towards selecting one alternative over the other, or some numbers for rating confidence over the 
others. Furthermore, a good measure of metacognition should manifest pure introspective ability independent 
of one’s first order performance.
Signal Detection Theory (SDT)21 provides a framework to obtain an estimate of metacognition with such 
characteristics. Meta-d′ is a measure based on the SDT which has recently been developed to estimate metacog-
nition independent of performance or response bias22, 23, 34. The main theoretical assumption behind the meta-d′ 
approach is that the choice and the confidence ratings originate from two different SDT models called type 1 and 
type 2 SDT each with their own respective sensitivity parameters. Metacognitive ability is the ratio of the type 
2 sensitivity to type 1 sensitivity, implying how much information is available to the observer at the meta-level, 
compared to the object level. For the perceptual task, we used the M-ratio = meta-d′/d′ as the measure of relative 
type 2 sensitivity to account for metacognitive ability.
Computing metacognition in the memory task however, is more challenging. The ‘old’-‘new’ stimuli aren’t 
necessarily modeled by equal variance SDT, so we used unequal variance SDT model of meta-d′. For this pur-
pose, the relative variance of the SDT model probability distributions are calculated based on the participant’s 
responses and confidence ratings, and assumed as a constant parameter in both type 1 and type 2 SDT models. 
Then, the unequal variance version of M-ratio would be M-ratio = meta-da/da. We used this measure to compute 
memory task metacognition. One caveat of this approach is that the variance is calculated using both type 1 and 
type 2 data, and is supposed to be equal in both SDT models. This challenges the presumption that type 1 and type 
2 SDT models are independent (see Maniscalco and Lau23 for more details). We also calculated Equal-variance 
meta-d′ for memory task metacognition and rechecked our results. We used the Matlab code available at http://
www.columbia.edu/~bsm2105/type2sdt/ for computing meta-d′ and meta-da in perceptual and memory tasks.
Pearson linear correlation coefficient was used to investigate relations between variables. Main effects 
and interaction effect of group and task on a measure was examined using mixed effect Group(SDI/con-
trol) × Task(perceptual/memory) Analysis of Variance (ANOVA). The statistical test used for comparing means 
was two-tailed t-test, and the assumption of equality or Inequality of variance was made according to Levene’s 
Test. Significance threshold (α) for all statistical tests was set to 0.05.
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